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HOW TO SUE THE GOVERNMENT 1
By HoN. J. E.

DODGE*

When, in 1893, I became assistant attorney-general of the
United States charged with defense of suits within the Claims
Jurisdiction; and more especially in the Court of Claims, I found
myself confronted with a docket of some 25,ooo cases, some of
them involving claims of several hundred distinct and individual
litigants, joined in interest only by the mutuality of their desire
to extract money out of the national treasury, and having their
local habitation in every state, and more especially in every
territory, of the country. I found these thousands of claimants
represented almost exclusively by the bar of the Court of Claims;
a body of some hundred or two gentlemen admitted to practice
by that court; some of them really lawyers, and more of them
lawyers only by virtue of such admission to practice; a bar very
largely recruited from the wreckage of public office whence they
have been stranded on the beach of lobbyism by one political
convulsion after another; men whose official positions had varied
from cabinet officers down through the ranks of senators, foreign
ministers, congressmen,' bureau chiefs, to the lowest grade of
clerk'; but who, upon being released from their respective duties
to their, mother country, had conceived that in the course of
performance of those duties they had acquired special facility -to
aid those desiring to assault her treasury, or at least special facility
to make the would-be claimants believe so. As a result of the
activities of that court, sundry millions of dollars are annually
paid from the treasury to the litigants, from which this bar of
the Court of Claims subtracts various proportions, ordinarily ranging from fifteen to fifty per cent of the recovery; seldom falling
below the first named figure and perhaps averaging about twentyfive per cent. It was early impressed upon my mind that so far as
residents of Wisconsin found it necessary to enter the ranks of
this litigant claimant horde, there was no reason why the profession of the law at home could not as well, or better, protect
'This is a lecture delivered before the Marquette University Law
School in i9io. Later it was published in pamphlet form as Bulletin V
which was the progenitor of the present MARQUETTE LAW REvmv. It is
now published in the REviEW so as to perpetuate the lecture and make it
available to our readers.
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their interests and, incidentally, promote the general welfare,
prosperity and happiness of Wisconsin lawyers, and it has seemed
to me that I might be of use to that profession, by calling the
attention of the members thereof to this fairly profitable field of
professional activity, to the benefit, also, both of the claimants
and of the court. Such is my excuse for presenting before you to
whom the portals are about to open, the dryest lucubration in
your scholastic experience. I pray it may have some utility to
atone for its prosiness.
The practice in suits on claims is so simple that the field is
specially adapted to the young lawyer. The individual claims
are often small in amount, but each may be typical of a very large
number resting upon substantially similar considerations, and
claimants are ordinarily very willing to assure an attorney a considerable contigent share of their claims if he will establish them;
and while the first may involve him in much work and long delay,
if he is successful the fruition may be very gratifying. An
illustration occurs to me of a member of the Court of Claims Bar,
originally from Wisconsin, by the way, who, meditating upon the
statutes regulating compensation of army officers, found those
statutes to provide for the pay of the several grades somewhat
thus: I will not be exact, but assume that first lieutenants were
allowed as basic pay, $i,6oo; second lieutenants, $i,8oo; captains,
$2,ooo and so on. He then found another statute which provided
that every army officer in the second five years of his continuous
service should receive an additional sum equal to ten per cent of
the annual pay of his grade, and that in the third five years of
service he should receive another ten per cent increase, and in
the fourth another, and in the fifth still another. Such increase
is officially dignified as "longevity allowance" but among irreverent lieutenants it is derived as "fogy" pay. This law had
always been construed by the paymaster's department as giving the
man with the $2,ooo basic pay, $2,2oo in his second five years;
$2,4oo in his third; $2,6oo in his fourth and $2,8oo in his fifth.
My friend, in a spasm of mathematical genius, became illumined
by the proposition that $2,4o0 was not a ten per cent increase on
$2,2oo, nor was $z,6oo a ten per cent increase over $2,4oo. After
brooding long in the effulgence of this brilliant discovery, he
decided that he might convince the Court of Claims of that proposition, and that an army officer should have received anywhere
from $20.00 up to perhaps $ioo.oo per year which had been
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denied him. This multiplied by six, the statutory years of limitation, would give a respectable recovery in individual cases, and
again multipled by the thousands of officers affected, promised the
discoverer wealth beyond the dreams of avarice. ie therefore
industriously circularized pretty much the entire army list, and
was rewarded by agreements from a large number that if he
would extract out of the public treasury these various sums, which
none of them had ever claimed or supposed himself entitled to,
he might retain the half thereof. He filed large numbers of
claims in order to save the statute of limitations, brought one to
trial, persuaded the Court of Claims of the soundness of his logic
and mathematics, and recovered a judgment, from which this
good and great government promptly appealed to the Supreme
Court, and there, after a delay of three of fours years, my friend's
ingenuity was again vindicated, the judgment affirmed, and the
claims were paid in great numbers; some of them, by reason
of the long pendency of the litigation, reaching as much, if I
remember right, as $i,:2o. This is but one, though perhaps an
unusually striking one, of many instances where the study of
statutes has been rewarded by the discovery of the meaning or
theory entitling the benficiaries to larger sums than have been
accorded them by the government officers having charge of. the
disbursements. This is but natural; for while the government
disbursing and accounting officers in the main seek to be fair
and to ascertain the true meaning of laws, they, probably properly,
resolve any doubtful question in favor of the retention in the
treasury of public money rather than in favor of paying it out.
I venture to take your time to suggest certain'fields where
industrious search by a young and not too busy lawyer might find
adequate reward. In Wisconsin to-day are some thousands of
men who went into the nation's serviceat the time of the war with
Spain, and later in connection with the Philippine insurrections,
who are now returned to private life. All of the laws and regulations as to the compensation to which they were entitled were
administered in much haste, and those men, generally, were ready
to assume that.what government officers paid them was all to
which they were entitled. As I look over the recent decisions of
the Court of Claims I find many in which the court takes a
different view of those laws and allows to such volunteer soldiers,
both officers and men, considerable sums which the paymasters
either never thought of or considered not properly payable.
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Another instance, reference to which in a newspaper has just met
my eye, is a decisionby the Court of Claims for recovery back of
certain excesses exacted under the law imposing inheritance taxes
during the Spanish war; probably each small in amount, but
amounting upon the claims filed to some five million dollars; an
amount which probably might be multiplied by a search of the
probate records of the entire country.
The federal Government is constantly enlarging, and adding to
its activities, and more and more coming in contact with individual
and property rights throughout the country. More and more
government buildings are being built; in the case of each is usually
more than one intricate contract subject to modification. and
change in the course of the work at the command of some public
officer, out of which difference of opinion as to the rights of the
contractors is fully as likely to arise as ir the case of similar
contracts between individuals, for the government officers are
arbitrary and dogmatic in requiring compliance with their own
views, and the courts readily recognize that the contractor is at
the mercy of such commands, and are slow to-hold him estopped
by submission thereto from demanding compensation. Lighthouses and harbors are being constructed by contract, and, perhaps
more frequently than in the case of private structures, are subject
to those modifications and changes which result in differences
of opinion as to compensation. Contracts, again, are being made
with many of the manufacturers and merchants in this part of
the country for stores, supplies, and machinery, in all of which
the question of performance or breach is one possible of dispute
which may be fruitful of litigation. As the maritime activities of
the Government in harbor construction and lake and river
protection and improvement increase, vessel charters become
numerous with resulting controversy as to compensation.
Again, at our elbow, are large numbers of government employees whose duties and compensation depend upon construction
of statutes. Their official superiors on the one hand are prone
to construe those statutes broadly for the imposition of duties,
while the accounting officers of the Government are somewhat
prone to more restricted view's, or at least to the withholding
of compensation for the performance of duties for which they
do not find clear sanction in the statutes, although the official
superior may have done so. Amongst these may be mentioned
the circle of postal employees in every city, indeed in every
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village; the railway postal clerks; the new class of employees
who make the rural deliveries, the contractors for the transportation of mails within the cities and over routes not served
by rail, often the local electric car.lines which are contracting
to large extent to carry mails; the federal courts, with their
various clerks, marshals and subordinates, all subject to suffer
deprivation of some money right by reason of differences of
opinion as to the meaning of the statutes which fix their compensation and duties.
Then there is the field of government liability upon what I
may term quasi-contracts, where private rights or property are
in effect taken for public use. Whenever harbor works are
constructed, private property is certain to be affected and liable
to be taken. The same is true with reference to the property
in the vicinity of rivers, where work in aid of navigation is done;
in the vicinity of military posts, rifle ranges, and even of government buildings. Again, there is the field of injuries to, or interference with, vessel property and private rights of navigation,
and in the use by the Government of all sorts of devices which
may be subject to patent. In every one of these fields, people in
our immediate locality may be sufferers, may well have rights
which ought to be enforced and vindicated, and which are often
in effect surrendered because of unfamiliarity with the methods
for obtaining redress.
Again, in the multiplicity of legislation are many acts of
Congress affecting private individuals and private enterprises
throughout the country from which may directly result a private
right to some compensation. There are, for instance, the recent
free alcohol statutes by which alcohol, treated and used in a
certain manner, is entitled to be free from the ordinary duty of
about $2.oo a gallon. At the time of the alcohol rebate provision
under the law of 1894, the Wilson Bill, everybody was astonished
at the number and general distribution of the industries in which
alcohol might be used entitling the user to such rebate. More
than 30,000 people were found to make claims, and how many
more had not yet been aroused to their opportunity, I "of course
cannot say. Again, in this great manufacturing state must be
numbers of people who make use of imported materials upon
which tariffs have been paid and who are entitled upon exportation of the manufactured article to repayment of the duty. Under
this provision of law has already arisen considerable litigation;
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the brewers, for instance, contending that imported bottles and
even imported corks had been manufactured by them into bottles
of beer, have claimed they were therefore entitled to rebate of
the duty which had been paid on those bottles and corks, a claim
which was not allowed. Corporation taxes are now being collected
under a statute the validity of which is already assailed, and the
exact construction of which will present many questions. Under
threat of penalties the amounts demanded must be paid, and their
recovery back will offer rewards for legal acuteness and
enterprise.
These are only a few of the phases of contract of your neighbors
and legitimate clients with the United States Government out of
which clains may grow inviting professional services.
II
Having discovered the extended field of its application, let, us
next turn to the reasons for the existence of judicial jurisdiction
over transactions and relations arising in that field, and then the
existence and limits of that jurisdiction under existing laws.
There is in the case of a state or a nation a legal entity,
intangible, and apprehensible only as a mental concept, which is
distinct from any or all of the people comprising the nation or any
or all of the individuals comprising its Government. The concept
of such an entity bears some analogy to the corporation, which is
a legal thing or person different from any of the individuals
composing it, whether mere stockholders and members or officers.
Such entity we call the state or the Government, somewhat interchangeably, though, strictly speaking, the Government is but the
authorized agent of the state to perform certain of the latter's
functions. That imaginary person or being presents a two-fold
aspect: first, the governmental one, in which it exerts certain
powers over the individuals composing it, but also one in close
analogy to a natural person or corporation. In the latter aspect it
may own property, like a state capitol, a custom house, a post
office, an army post or a battleship, as also chattels, merchandise
and choses in action. It may come in contacts of various kinds
with individuals and their property. It may contract with you
or me for the purchase of property or for our labor, in which
case, obviously, we do not work for any individual, our property
when purchased does not pass to any individual, but to that somewhat imaginary being, the state or the nation. Since it can
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contract to pay money or deliver property, it can fail to perform
its contracts, and may thus become indebted, or, in other words,
owe a duty to pay money in performance of such contract or as
damages for breach, just as can an individual. We are all of us
familiar with this aspect of a municipality and its government,
and this largely for the reason that we and our neighbors more
frequently come in contact with such entities and their activities
in the more personal aspect of the ownership of property, and in
the transaction of business, all of which is more directly under
our notice. These municipalities have always been subject to
the power of courts to compel the performance of such obligations. In the case of sovereign states and nations, however, there
has persisted from the earliest times a doctrine that their obligations could not be coerced in court. When our neighbor refuses
to pay us money that he owes, or refuses to deliver to us our
property which he holds, we can apply to a court to establish
the fact that he does so refuse wrongfully and to compel him by
its judgment to perform or pay. -All that because the court is a
branch of the government under which each individual lives.
But the state lives not under, but above, its government and every
branch thereof. That government and all of its parts and officers
are mere agents deemed subordinates of the state, and it was for a
long time deemed anomalous and improper that the subordinate
should be entrusted with authority to command its master. Hence
the maxim, old as the conception of sovereignty, that no sovereign
can be sued without'its own consent, and the United States
lived up to this maxim very religiously for the first seventy
years of its national existence. In support of that maxim is the
argument that nations are always willing to do right voluntarily;
that if 'the United States is under obligation to pay money to any
one, theoretically the Government is ready and willing to do soand needs no coercion by courts, which indeed are only a partof the Government. This involves a conception of a Government
which might exist in the millenium, when the necessity for all
government has gone by, but up to the present time a practical
working, the results of that theory or maxim have been disappointing. However ready and anxious the nation or the Government may be, theoretically to do justice, and especially that
branch of the government which we call the legislature, yet,
since the legislatures or congress must be made up of fallible
and erring individuals, they have generally failed to come up to
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that degree of perfection of wisdom and morals necessary to an
infallible ascertainment of duty, or even to prompt and accurate
performance of it, and many individuals to whom an obligation
of payment was pretty obviously owed have worn out their lives
in attempts to obtain recognition and performance of such duty.
In the case of the United States, the practical difficulties in
the way of legislative working out of the exact pecuniary obligation of the Government or the nation to individuals have been
found well-nigh insurmountable, and fraught with so large a
proportion of injustice to one or the other party as to be
unbearable.
The condition of things thus brought about is aptly, though
very moderately, described by Hon. William A. Richardson, many
years Chief Justice of the Court of Claims, in a history of that
court published in the seventeenth volume of the Court of Claims
reports. It at last led to efforts to mitigate the evil, which are
described with exactness in Chief Justice Richardson's history
above mentioned. The first legislation on the subject in 1855,
went little further than to create a commission, although made
up of so-called judges holding for life,, whose function was merely
to investigate and express an opinion on claims, which then were
considered by Congress, where, the court's opinion having no
controlling effect, the same confusion, opportunity for fraud,
and either neglect or absorption of congressional time arose, as
if they had not received consideration by the court. This was
followed in 1863 by legislation empowering the rendition of judgments to be paid "out of any general appropriations made by law
for the payment and satisfaction of private claims." The
presentation of these judgments to congress for appropriations
was, however, subjected to discretionary approval by the
Secretary of the Treasury, who might report them for appropriation or refuse to do so. The Supreme Court, on this ground,
declined to recognize the function of the Court of Claims as
completely a judicial one, and refused to entertain appeals from
its judgments. This provision, however, was eliminated in i866,
since .which time the judgments of the Court of Claims have
been paid almost without exception by virtue of appropriations
made each year, wherein Congress describes the several judgments which are to be paid. While thus the judgments are in
practice generally recognized by Congress as concluding the rights
of the parties, in practical results they have not quite that effect,
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for Congress may omit or refuse to appropriate money to pay
any one or more of such judgments, in which case they would
become practically useless and ineffective except as a ground of
criticism of the legislative branch.
The law prescribing the general jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims was originally embodied in the Revised Statutes of 1873,
in Ch. 21, Secs. lO49 to lO93. That jurisdiction has from time
to time been enlarged by certain amendments, notably by what
is known as the Bowman Act of March 3, 1883, and by the more
comprehensive act ascribed to Randolph Tucker, of March 3,
1887. The'latter Act, with subsequent detail amendments, may
be considered as the general charter to the courts to entertain
suits against the United States. That general jurisdiction, as
described in the Tucker Act, extends, first, to "All claims founded
upon the Constitution of the United States or any law of Congress, except for pensions, or upon any regulation of an executive
department or upon any contract express or implied with the
Government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or
unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort; second, all set-off,
counterclaims and claims for damages on the part of the Government against any claimant in said court." Section 2 of the Act of
1887 for the first time provided that the District Courts of the
United States should have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court
of Claims as to all matters named in the preceding section where
the amount of the claim does not exceed $iooo and the Circuit
Courts of the United States shall have such concurrent jurisdiction
of all such claims between $i,ooo and $io,ooo. This section has
since been amended to exclude from the local courts suits for fees
or official compensation of officers of the United States. Certain
exceptions and various phases of special jurisdiction may be
omitted from even mention at present as they would confuse the
consideration of this general scheme.
Primarily, it should be borne in mind that this act is not
regulative of any existing right, for no right inheres in the
individual to sue the nation. On the contrary, it merely confers
a privilege ex gratia. This distinction is important, in both construction and application; in construction, because any right
claimed under it must find clear words or implication to support
it; in application, because all qualifying or restrictive provisions
express absolute conditions precedent with no government officer
can waive. For this reason the language of the ordinary six year
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statutes of limitations which appears in this act, does not, as
ordinarily construed, merely confer the right to a defense which
may be waived by failure to plead it, but absolutely denies any
jurisdiction when the six years have elapsed.
Another limitation on the right to sue which may as well be
mentioned here, though not in the Court of Claims Act, is found
in Sec. 3477 R. S. U. S., declaring all assignments of claims null
and void, so that suit by an assignee cannot be entertained. This,
however, is held not to apply to assignments by operation of law
as in bankruptcy, insolvency, probate or on execution or other
court process.
III
Turning now to the construction of the several details of this
statute, it will be observed from the quotation made that the
jurisdiction is only over "claims." The word claim in these
statutes has been construed as limited to money demands so as
to exclude attempts to enforce the delivery of property, the
conveyance of land, or the compulsion of any act by governmental
officers except as the same may be ancillary to the jurisdiction to
render a money judgment. So one cannot sue for such ultimate
relief as specific performance, mandamus, injunction, or quieting
title, but merely to recover money.
Next, a sueable claim may be one "founded on the constitution."
I know of no case in which any money claim has been sustained
under this clause except by virtue of that provision of the
Fifteenth Amendment which provides that no private property
shall be taken for public use without just compensation. To so
sustain these the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court have
transposed this phrase into "just compensation shall be made for
all private property which may be taken"; a somewhat doubtful
equivalent, but now fully sanctioned. Some rather nice lines of
distinction have been drawn in this class of cases which are
quite numerous. The first of these is between a taking of private
property by the United States so that compensation must be made
and a mere deprivation of the owner's control and possession
thereof by some federal officer without authority of law, in which
case it is held that his property is not taken by the Government
and therefore right to compensation does not arise, although by
reason of the physical power at the command of the public officer
the private individual may be just as completely deprived and the
United States may completely enjoy. The leading case sustaining
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a right of recovery is Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645, where
engineer officers of the United States, under authority of an Act
of Congress, tapped the Potomac River and drew therefrom water
supply for the city of Washington to impairment or destruction
of the water powers owned by the claimant. It was held that the
acts of the officers, being authorized by law, amounted to a taking
from the claimant by the Government of property for public use,
and that Congress, being presumed to act in 'obedience to the
Constitution, must have intended to imply in their legislation a
promise to pay the owners. Perhaps the leading case upon the
principle involved on the other side, although not a claims case,
was Kaufman v. Lee, io6 U. S. 196, where representatives of
Robert E. Lee, the Confederate General, brought suit in ejectment against an army officer in command of a post established
on the estate of Arlington near Washington. The action was
sustained on the ground that the army officer had no authority in
law to occupy private property. His possession of it, therefore,
was held not the possession of the United States, and judgment
in ejectment against him was sustained notwithstanding the consideration that such judgment could by the Government be
rendered entirely futile by removing that particular officer from
the command of the post and substituting another. But the
principle has been applied to numerous claims cases. Thus in
Langford, ioi U. S. 341, an Indian agent possessed himself of
private buildings under a contention of right so to do, and it was
held that it was not a conscious taking by the Government, but a
tortious violation of a private right by the officer and therefore
not within the claims jurisdiction. These cases, with subsequent
ones referring to them, will serve to illustrate and mark more
clearly this line of distinction. The clause of the claims jurisdiction act has been invoked to justify recoveries for the use of
patents in Government work in very many instances, and the line
of distinction between those resulting in a sueable claim and those
not so resulting seems to turn upon whether the government
officer, within his legal authority, uses the patent knowingly and
in recognition of the patentee's rights, either with or without any
express contract to pay a royalty; or whether the patent is used
either in ignorance or denial of the patentee's rights. In the first,
liability results; in the latter, not. Interesting and typical cases
upon patents are Schillinger, 155 U. S. 163; Berdam F. Co. I56
U. S. 552; Russell, 182 id. 516; Bethlehem S. Co. 42 C. C. 365;
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Brooks, 39 C. C. 494. Use of inventions patented by government
employees has been prolific of many claims for compensation
which have been generally controlled by the above principles.
Gill,

25

C. G. 415; Harley, 39 id. 1o5; McAleer,-iO U. S. 424.

Another distinction in this field is that between a taking and
the commission of acts entirely within their lawfully authority by
government officers, resulting in consequential damages or interference with the enjoyment of private property by the owner.
Thus, if in the performance of its power and duty to improve
the navigation of streams, the Government actually occupies the
land of a private owner, as by the abutment of a bridge, or by
storing water upon it, it will be deemed a taking for which
compensation must be made. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.
13 Wall. i66; Lynah, 188 U. S. 445. On the other hand if a
dam or other structure in improvement of navigation merely has
the effect to interfere with private owner's access or use, without
actually invading his property, it is uniformly held that there is no
taking, but merely a consequential damage for which'no liability
results. Gibson, 66 U. S. 269; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 id. 141;
Bedford, 192 id. 217.
I must not spend time on further illustrations, but hasten to
certain other phases of jurisdiction.

IV
The next class of sueable claims are those "arising upon any
law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an executive department." Under this head" naturally the claims are multitudinous:
Most obviously, those of officers or employees of the government
to whom some statute or regulation provides compensation. Such
claim may arise on behalf of any officer from the President of
the United States to the most temporary employee, and involve
often very nice analysis of confusing statutes. A question of 'this
sort frequently arising is whether an appropriation act actually
setting a specific sum aside to pay for services of an officer or an
employee, different in amount from the salary of the office as
fixed by some previous general statute is to be deemed a modification or repeal of the former legislation. Obviously Congress may,
and not infrequently does, intend to presently appropriate a less
sum than is, or at the end of the fiscal year will be, due the officer.
Thus the salary of an Indian agent may be a general statute be
fixed at $i,8oo, and Congress by the annual appropriation act may
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set aside but $1,500 to be paid him, leaving the remaining $3oo due
but not payable out of any money yet appropriated by Congress.
The holding of "the court have been various upon different situations; in some cases holding that there was a discoverable purpose
in the appropriation act to legislate with reference to the amout
of compensation earned, and thus to amend or pro tanto repeal
the previous statute on that subject; in other holding that no
such purpose could be discovered and the appropriated amount
must be deemed merely a partial payment on account so that the
balance might be sued for. Illustrations of the discussion of
these questions will be found in Langston, I18 U. S. 389; Belknap.
150 id. 588.
Another question constantly arising is whether new or unusual
duties imposed upon one holding a governmental office or employment entitle him to additional compensation or are merely
additional burdens imposed upon him ex officio and therefore to
be performed for the salary of the office under the doctrine of
curn onere. An illustration is the case of Mullett, 15o U. S. 566,
one of the first claims cases which I had occasion to argue to the
Supreme Court of the United States. There, Mullett, who was
supervising architect of the treasury, upon a salary of $5,ooo a
year, with duties not specifically defined, but ordinarily employed
in architectural supervision of court houses and post offices
throughout the country, prepared tentative plans for the great
building of.the State War and Navy Departments at Washington
in response to a request from a commission which had been
appointed to take charge of the construction of such a building
with authority to employ architects. Such plans were accepted,
and the building, at the expense of more than ten million dollars,
erected thereon; Mullett superintending the construction while
three million dollars were being expended-all with the consent
of the Secretary of the Treasury, and while retaining his position
and salary as supervising architect. He claimed architect's and
superintendents' commissions to the extent of five per cent or some
half million dollars. He was denied recovery. Another case in
which the preceding authorities are quite fully reviewed, is that
of King, 147 U. S. 676.
Another curious case in the same line was that of Gibson v.
Peters, 15o U. S. 242, where a district attorney attended to litigation for the receiver of a national bank, and it was held that he
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could not recover from the receiver compensation other- than his
official fees as district attorney.
There have been cases of recovery on certain grounds of distinction, one of which is that of Saunders, 12o U. S. 126, justifying
the holding of two distinct offices and the receipt of the salary of
both if their duties are not incompatible.
Another class of claims somewhat similar have been those for
overtime, especially since the law prescribing eight hour days
for various subordinate employes and clerks. Generally such
claims have been disallowed, but in many instances .special statutes
have been enacted for the payment of overtime, in which case
of course arose legitimate claims under statute, usually in large
classes and very profitable to the attorneys representing them.
Another set of claims founded upon statute have been brought
by discharged or reduced employees and officers, claiming that
their discharge or reduction was unlawful and therefore ineffective. In the civil offices and employments, of course these
have been almost exclusively since the adoption of civil service
statutes and regulations. In general such claims have been defeated, usually because the civil service statutes did not attempt to
interfere with the executive power of removal. But there has
also been made the contention that statutes could not so interfere,
the power of removal inhering in the executive and being beyond
any restriction by Congress. "This subject was fully argued by
me in the case of Parsons, 167 U. S. 324, but the court did not
deal with the constitutional question, for they construed the law
is not intending to deprive the President of the power of removal.
A different rule exists, however, by virtue of differences in the
statute and' constitution in regard to the army, discharges from
which are, in time of peace at least, regulated by statute, and
there are many cases where officers or men have been discharged
and gone out of actual service, and years later the discharge has
been found to be prohibited by statute. The holding has pretty
uniformily been that it was a question of status; that a man
becoming a soldier remained such until legally discharged from
the service, and that the pay prescribed by law was an incident
of the status, and many recoveries have been had under quite
surprising circumstances of entire absence of services through
many years.
A curious case, either based upon a statute or founded- upon
the constitutional right, has arisen out of the acquisition of Porto

HOW TO SUE THE GOVERNMENT

Rico, that of Sanches, 42 Courts of Claims Re. 458, since affirmed.
The claimant, while a subject of Spain, purchased the office of
procurador of the courts, in perpetuity, and received a patent
from the King of Spain. After our acquisition, the military
governor abolished the office. It was claimed that this was a
taking of property so as to make the United States liable. The
court held the abolition, of the office was within the lawful power
of the military governor, and therefore not a tort; but that, notwithstanding the ownership of the office was a valuable property
right according to Spanish law, such office under the principles
of the United States Government could not be a property right,
and hence the abolition of the office did not constitute a taking
of property.
Another variety of claims which falls under this head arises
under certain rebate provisions in the Statutes of the United
States, as, for example, under provisions for rebating to manufactureis using imported goods upon which customs duties have
been charged, the amount or some portion of the amount of such
duties. Campbell's case, io 7 U. S. 407. Also there was in my
time a very extended class of claims for rebate of the internal
revenue duty upon alcohol used in manufactures, amounting it
was estimated to some .twenty million dollars annually. These
were defeated upon a construction that the statute granting them
was conditioned upon the use being in accordance with regulations
to be first promulgated by the treasury department, a step that
was never reached during the lifetime of the law (Di4nlap case,
173 U. S. 65), making a very narrow distinction from the Campbell case, supra.
Another illustration of claims arising upon a statute which led
to a very famous litigation, was that for sugar bounties provided
for by the Wilson Bill, which abolished the preceding law granting
bounties generally, which had been attacked in Congress as unconstitutional, but granted as a Sort of consolation, a sum equal
to about one half of the previous bounties earned during the crop
year in which the repeal bill was enacted. The allowance of
these claims by the Court of Claims was opposed upon the ground
of want of power in Congress to grant bounties: a litigation in
which the most eminent counsel in the country were employed for
the claimants, including Mr. Choate of New York and Mr.
Semmes of Louisiana, who had been a senator in the confederate
government and a brother of the famous Admiral Raphael
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Semmes. The Supreme Court evaded the constitutiouality of
bounties by holding that those who acted in establishing a manufactory of sugar on the faith of such an apparent law, though
unconstitutional, might arouse such a moral obligation from the
government to them, that a subsequent appropriation in recognition of that moral obligation might arise sufficient to support a
subsequent gift. Some of us who had been upon the defensive
thought a new principle, both in law and physics, was established
by this decision, namely, that a chasm too wide for a single leap
might nevertheless, by Congress at least, if not by an individual,
be cleared in two jumps.
Other classes of cases are continually arising under new
statutes, and this field offers abundant reward for ingenuity and
exploration, but I must pass to the next class of claims under this
Court of Claims charter, which are:
V
Those founded upon "any contract, express or implied, with
the Government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated
or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which
claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United
States either in a court of law or equity or admiralty if the
United States were sueable." This is a very complex clause, and
its construction has presented many questions of doubt. It is,
first, obvious that claims are authorized upon express contracts
to pay rnoney, and these are of course very numerous in the
varied activities of our National Government and involve
enormous amounts of money. River and harbor work, improvement of navigation, construction of public buildings, transportation of mail, government employees, troops, stores and supplies,
construction of naval vessels and revenue cutters and dry docks
and furnishing of supplies of all sorts, are but a partial illustration
of the contracts which the Government is continually making
wherein it promises to pay money. In the nature of things such
contracts involve differences of opinion as to their- construction
which are ordinarily resolved by the executive officers most
favorably to the Government, and thus many doubtful questions
here arise for adjustment in court. But government contracts are
fruitful of litigation for other reasons. They are necessarily
performed under the direction and command of some public officer
whose primary and most important point of view, if he is faithful
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to his duties, is the obtaining of that which is necessary for the
purpose of the Government, even though in excess of the contract.
If the contract has been ambiguously drawn, the contractor of
course contends for that construction which will render performance easiest. The public officer, on the other hand, contends for
that which will give the government what he thinks it ought to
have. But the latter is equipped. vith drastic powers. He can refuse to receive that which is not in accordance with his construction of a contract and he can command that which he thinks ought
to be done, and the contractor has, practically, no alternative but to
obey. The contracts are often so large that the periodical payments of actual money are necessary to the continuance of the contractor's business life. Further than this, even, if the government
officer in charge becomes convinced that the work or commodity
unambiguously specified is not such as will serve the Government's
purpose, he ordinarily does not hesitate to insist on that which will,
leaving the contractor to discuss the question of compensation with
some other representative of the Government later, and again the
contractor has little choice but to comply. E:igencies of government work are such that frequently, if not ordinarily, there is not
time for the making of new contracts when defects in existing ones
are discovered, and thus, even more than in contract relations between individuals, arise questions to be settled afterwards The
Court of Claims, and the Supreme Court in review of its decisions,
have recognized this arbitrary -power in government officials to
coerce by withholding of money and in other ways the .doing of
acts against the will and right of the contractor, and permit recovery upon less showing of duress than is usual as between
private individuals. Intent on the part of the contractors to concede the contention of, the government officer as to the true
measbre of the contractual duty from the mere act of obedience is
not so readily inferred. A very moderate showing of damage to
contractor, likely or threatened, as a result of refusing to obey, if
accompanied by reasonable protest, will ordinarily be sufficient to
entitle him to a consideration by the court of the question of his
r'eal duty under the contract as an original one.
It is also a pretty obvious donstruction of the last quoted clause
of the jurisdictional statute that sueable claims may arise for
damages growing out of breach of an express contract, and these
are, generally speaking, controlled by the general law of contracts.
Indeed I should be inclined to say that here too breach of contract
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in the sense of preventing the contractor from performance was
somewhat more readily presumed or found than between private
individuals because of the absolute physical power of the government officerto prevent acts of the contractor which he forbids.
Again, it will be noted that implied contracts are recognized as
foundation of legitimate claims. There never has been any doubt
in regard to true implied contracts, those where the intention
of the parties to promise to pay money is inferred from words
or acts. Thus an army officer authorized to purchase certain
goods who orders such goods will commit'the Government to an
implied contract to pay for them, although no word of promise is
uttered. The rules governing claims so founded are those of the
law generally as applied between individuals, of which, by the
time you graduate, you will of course be fully informed. But
the dispute has been serious as to that type of what is sometimes
called implied contract, but more properly quasi-contract, which
proceed not on the inference that the parties had any intention or
understanding that a promise was made by the Government to
pay, but so act that the Government ought to pay. The great
majority of those situations as between individuals arise out of
torts, as where one unlawfully takes another's property; although
his intention very obviously is not to pay for it, the law imposes
upon him a duty to do so. Now it will be noticed that this jurisdictional clause contains the phrase, "in case not sounding in
tort," and that phrase has been given very dominating effect in
the construction of the statute, and many cases have declared
that, if the act out of which contract to pay was sought to be
implied were tortious, no jurisdiction is given to any court to
consider it. Much refinement of atgument has been indulged
by counsel and court in reference to this. It has been insisted
that the Government cannot do any unlawful act, cannot ilnlawfully deprive a man of his property, because the Government's
powers are strictly limited by law, and when such act, committed
as it must be by some individual, is unlawful, that is, not
authorized by law, the Government does not act at all, but only
the individual. This, it has been argued, leads back to the old
doctrine that the Government, like the king, can do no wrong, and,
speaking generally, this doctrine has been pretty logically applied
by the court, and where no authority of law could be found for
the act done or it was in defiance of law, it has been held that
any moral duty of the Government to pay could not be enforced
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in court, but must, as before the creation of the Court of Claims,
be presented to the conscience of Congress. An interesting discussion appears in Bigby, 188 U. S. 4o0, a case of injury from a
defective elevator. There have on the other hand been many
phases of quasi-contract held to result in a money claim which
could be enforced. Most prominent amongst these are cases
where the payment of money has been coerced, which the
individual was not under legal obligation to pay.
VI
The remaining grant of jurisdiction over setoff and counterclaims presents some phases peculiar to the Court of Claims
which I ought to mention. While many demands that the Government may have and properly present against an individual do not
differ in their characteristics at all from those with which you
will become familiar in general practice, there are some which
rest on principles peculiarly applicable of the Government. The
fundamental principle at the basis pf these is that all individuals
performing any acts on behalf of the Government are creatures
of the law, and their power and authority limited by the law of
which all persons have constructive knowledge. When, therefore,
a public officer, be he highest in official grade or lowest in clerical
service, pays out to an individual money which the law did not
authorize, or releases him from payment which, under the law he
ought to make, such officer exceeds the authority conferred upon
him, and neither the United States nor the Government acts in
so doing; and therefore the individual has received or retained the
money unlawfully and is chargeable with knowledge that he has
done so, and the Government may recover back, unhampered by
any of the rules of voluntary payment or mistake of law applicable
as between individuals. The principle is supplemented by the rule
that no statutes of limitation run against the Government. It
becomes obvious that the right to counterclaim is a very broad one.
No matter at what stage in history an individual may have received
or retained money, under however well established departmental construction of the law, the correctness of the construction
may be repudiated and the court invoked to decide upon it and
require a repayment with interest. It has become pretty well
established in the departments that settlements made in pursuance
of a fairly established rule of construction, in the absence of any
fraud or collusion, will be permitted to stand, unless the individual
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party to such settlement is likely to be against the Government.
If he does so, however, any such settlement is likely to be
repudiated and the claimant called to a new accounting. Some
decisions in line with these principles have been so extreme in
their results as to be very surprising to the claimant and his
attorney.
Thus in the Verdier case, 164 U. S. 213, decided in 1896: a
postmaster in 187o had retired from office with a balance against
him of $929.oo, as the accounts were then kept. In 1883 Congress
authorized a restatement of all postmaster's accounts upon a
different basis of computation, and on such restatement for the
years 1866 to 1869 it was found that there was actually due him
at the time he retired some $2,900 more than had been allowed.
His previous apparent defalcation which had been reduced to a
judgment in favor of the United States was set up as a counterclaim and was found to amount with interest to about $2,300,
which it was held proper to deduct from the principal of what
was due him on restatement of his salary account which drew no
interest.
In Wisconsin Central Railroad, 164 U. S. 190.205 the principals
above stated were carried to their logical extent and many other
decisions cited. The Wisconsin Central claimed pay for carrying
the mails. Postmaster General Gresham, with the aid of his law
officer, after full argument, construed the statutes as allowing full
contract rates not reduced by reason of a land grant havingbeen
made to the company, and on these rulings the company was paid
such full rates up to 1884 for many years, at which time a
different construction of the law was adopted by Postmaster
Gresham and the lower rate paid thereafter. Upon an application
by the company, Postmaster General Vilas, on his accession, again
considered the whole subject judicially, with the aid of his law
officer, General E. E. Bryant, and adhered to the rule last adopted
in favor of the lower compensation; but not content with so
ruling as to future payments, he caused to be restated the closed
accounts upon the lower basis, whereby the company was found
to have received on the deliberate judicial consideration of the
Postmaster General and settlements in accordance therewith, the
sum of $12,ooo in excess of what it was entitled to, and this it
was held was money of the United States unlawfully received,
and judgment for its recovery back was affirmed in the Supreme
Court.
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Many other striking illustrations might be given, especially of
officers or einployees of the United States, who, having a trifling
controversy as to the amount of fee or compensation to which they
are entitled for some service, and having sued therefore, were
confronted by erroneous rulings in their favor by the highest
government officials and have been required to pay back moneys
which they had received and spent, relying upon such rulings
many years before, and manifold the amount of the claim which
they represented; whereas, if they had been content to let sleeping
dogs lie,- they would never have been disturbed in their retention
of it.
There are also many subjects over which special jurisdiction
has at times been conferred on the Court of Claims, even an
enumeration of which would be an abuse of your patience and
of little value, since each of the acts of Congress granting the
jurisdiction prescribes peculiar rules of law to be applied.
VII
The procedure, pleading and practice, in the Court of Claims
present no serious terrors or difficulties to a Wisconsin lawyer.
Once the question of jurisdiction is passed, the hearing and
adjudication upon the claim proceed according to a typical code
practice, of which the merest general outline is prescribed by
statute, and within which, according to the liberal custom of the
court, one can hardly make fatal mistakes or errors. You wil
find it described in the rules of the Court of Claims, obtainable
from the clerk, and in Vol. II Foster'sFed. Practice.
The suit is commenced by filing with the clerk a petition
corresponding to the complaint in Wisconsin. That petition may
be signed and verified by the claimant in his own name, by any
attorney in fact, or by any member of the Court of Claims Bar
whose duly acknowledged power of attorney accompanies the
petition. There are certain detail steps necessary to such commencement, which are prescribed by rules: such as the filing of
a certain number of copies in order that the clerk may deliver
them to the representative of the Government, namely, the
assistant attorney-general in charge; also, that within a brief time
after the original filing, there must be filed a certain number of
printed copies of the petition, unless that be dispensed with by
order of court. Ordinarily they are filed. These steps are
regulated by sec. 1072 R. S. U. S. and by the rules of court.
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Their omission will merely delay progress. No service is required
other than the deposit with the clerk, whose duty it is, as I have
said, to deliver copies to the assistant attorney-general. The
filing of a petition, the verification, and the authentication of the
power of attorney are, in a sense at least, jurisdictional- steps;
important not so much to the further procedure as to the purpose
of stopping the statute of limitations in case of dismissal.
The petition itself may and should be characterized by the
utmost simplicity. By statute, it must set forth the claim, the
action thereon in Congress, or by any of the departments, if any
has been had; what persons are owners thereof or interested
therein; when and how each person became interested; that no
assignment or transfer of said claim has been made; and that
the claimant is justly entitled to the amount therein stated from
the United States after allowing all just credits and set-offs;
that the claimant, if a citizen, has at all times borne true allegiance
to the Government of the United States, and, whether a citizen or
not, has not voluntarily aided, abetted or encouraged rebellion
against the said government. The rules add little to these
statutory requirements. They require, first, the title of the action
with full Christian and surnames of all claimants; second, a plain
concise statement of the facts, giving venue and date, free from
argumentative, irrelevent and impertinent matter; and that, if
claim be founded upon express contract, the substance thereof
shall set forth in the petition and the original or a copy, .in writing,
must be annexed; also that the bar of the statute of limitations
be negatived, in case more than six years appear to have expired
since the claim accrued, by setting up the existence and duration
of any disability preventing the filing of the petition. In practical
application of thbse statutes and rules, any petition which states
facts from which, by any reasonable inference, may result a
liability of the Government to the claimant within the claims
jurisdiction, will suffice to enable the court to relieve all evidence
of transactions having reasonable relation to those mentioned in
the petition and to ascertain and adjudge the right of recovery;
unless indeed it states facts negativing the existence of a claim
within the jurisdiction, as for example by showing that the right
of the claimant to a money recovery is based upon tort or that
it accrued beyond the period of limitation, or that it has been
assigned. Of course this liberality in the treatment of the petition
is guarded by rules which enable the government counsel to

HOW TO SUE THE GOVERNMENT

demand greater specification, if necessary; but it must be
remembered that in the case of probably ninety per cent of
the claims, they have already been investigated, passed upon and
disallowed by some of the executive departments, so that. the
attorney-general can be furnished from that department not only
with an explanation of the attitude of the Government adverse
to the claim, but a reas6nably full statement of the facts and
circumstances claimed to support it, and in practical working no
more specification is ordinarily demanded by government counsel
than will serve to identify the claim sued on with some claim
theretofore presented and disallowed by some executive officer.
After the petition is filed and the copies thereof delivered to the
assistant attorney-general he may make all the usual motions and
pleadings. He may move to dismiss for non-compliance with the
law in regard to filing or authentication of the petition, but seldom
does. He may raise the question of sufficiency of parties claimant
or of the immaturity of the claim by motion in the nature of
plea in abatement, or he may demur, but substantially on no
ground except that the petition does not state facts from which
any claimant against the Government arises within the jurisdiction
of the court: one of which reasons, in accordance with what has
already been said, is, that the claim accrued more than six years
before the filing of the petition, since that is a jurisdictional fact
and one of which the attorney-general cannot waive the fatal
effect. By the rules, the defendant's pleadings must be filed
within sixty days after the position, but in practical working
expiration of that period is not customarily held to bar the right
of the Government to raise any such objections.
Neither motion nor demurrer being interposed, or if interposed
overruled, the attorney-general may then plead any set-off or
counterclaim. The nature of such set-offs and counterclaims
I have mentioned elsewhere. He may also set up the fact if it
is not, as it should be, made apparent by the petition, that the
claim has been assigned which on grounds of public policy is a
complete defense, as I have previously explained. He may also
set up by answer that the claimant or his privies have practiced
or attempted to practice some fraud against the United States,
which fact is fatal-to 'the claim by virtue of see. io86 R. S. U* S.,
which provides that any person who corruptly practices or
attempts to practice any fraud against the United States in the
proof, statement establishment or allowance of any claim or any
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part of any claim against the United States shall ipso facto forfeit
the same to the Government, and it shall be the duty of the Court
of Claims in such case to find specifically that such fraud was
practiced or attempted to be practiced, and thereupon give
judgment that such claim is forfeited to the Government, and that
the claimant be forever barred from prosecuting the same. No
omission of the attorney-general to make or sustain plea, demurrer
or special defense, however, gives any right to the claimant to
take judgment pro confesso or by default. This is guarded against
by a rule that if the attorney-general refuses to plead over, the
claimant may proceed with his case, but shall not have judgment
for his claim unless he establishes the same by proof satisfactory
to the court; and by another rule which provides that if the
attorney-general refrains from interposing any of the before
mentioned motions, pleas or special defences for a period of sixty
days, a general traverse of the petition shall be considered as
entered. In the overwhelming majority of cases the attorneygeneral in fact interposes no pleading whatever, but rests upon
the general traverse by this rule implied. This custom has grown
out of the condition before mentioned, that the claims and contentions both of the claimant and of the executive department
which has denied his claim, are there already well known and
matter of record, and such record will, as we shall discover in a
few minutes, be shortly communicated to the court, thus serving
the purpose of the fullest possible exposition of the claims of both
parties; and hence rendering particularization and specification
of the respective contentions, either fact of law, unnecessary in
the pleadings. In case a counterclaim or set-off is pleaded, or the
practice or fraud on the part of the claimant, the latter must reply
under oath within the next three months. In other cases no
further pleading of the claimant is necessary.
At this stage in the procedure of suit on a claim usually
intervene certain steps peculiar to that court. Either first the
claimant moves the court to make a "call," as it is termed, upon
the executive department, where are the records of all proceedings, correspondence and departmental rulings on the transactions
out of which the claim accrued, upon which the court may make
that call, which is in form a request and may, theoretically, be
refused in the discretion of the executive department, but, in
practical working, is almost uniformly complied with. There are
certain restrictions in the rules of the court on abuse of this

HOW TO SUE THE GOVERNMENT

privilege in the claimant so that the departments shall not be
troubled unnecessarily, but, generally speaking, the court is very
free to call for, and very uniformly receives, the whole recordof the transaction. This motion by the claimant may be made for
use of the documents as evidence, or upon a proper showing it
may also be made to enable him to frame his petition. On the
other hand, it is the custom of the assistant attorney-general as
soon as he receives a petition from the clerk of court, to immediately transmit it to the department whose ruling in denying
the claim it has thus become his duty to defend in court, and he
requests information which will enable him to make that defense,
to which response is almost uniformly made by transmission of
all papers and documents on the subject, or certified copies thereof, and these he may file in court. In practice, they are received
in evidence with the utmost freedom and are often the sole basis
upon which the court decides and, almost uniformly, an important
part of the evidence before that court. The assistant attorneygeneral, not infrequently, with such documents receives information from the law officer of the department where the transactions
occurred, stating the reasons and authorities for adverse decision
to the claim, which often is filed with the other papers of the
Court of Claims and, while not evidentiary of specific facts, is
considered by the court much as would be a brief on such
subjects.
At any time after the issue is framed so that the disputed facts
become defined, the parties are at liberty to take evidence as to
'those facts and to any new facts which they may deem material.
According to the literal reading of the rules, this right is first in
the claimant and, after he announced completion of his evidence, is
in the defendant. In practice, however, especially in my time,
either party took such evidence as he pleased at any time after
the issues had been defined .y the report of the department where
the claim arose and the claimant, usually, was not allowed to
take testimony until that time. True, the attorney for the Government had no authority under the rules to impose such a condition
precedent, but the court and the department of justice being
burdened with approximately twenty-five times as many cases as
they could handle, some cases had to wait, and the court quite
uniformly listened to the statement of the assistant attorneygeneral that it was not consistent with the dispatch of other
business to turn the attention of his bureau to the taking of
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evidence in a particular case at the particular time named by the
claimant: claimants knowing this, usually yielded to such requests
to postpone. This power was exercised in this way be.cause in a
great majority of cases a large part of the facts became either
established or conceded by the documentary evidence from the
department, and the taking of much evidence was obviated, to the
expedition not only of business generally, but of the particular
case.
As an almost uniform rule, the evidence is all taken by
deposition. Rules so provide, except that the c.ouit may upon a
showing of reasons order that any witness be produced before the
court or before some judge thereof. Such a step, I believe, wa8
only once taken during my term as assistant attorney-general,
and that was upon a motion for a new -trial after the claim had
been adjudgedby the Court of Claims and affirmed by the Supreme
Court, in order to enable me to raise the defense of practice
of fraud perpetrated by forgery; and some witness, who must
have been in complicity in the fraud if there such existed, .was
ordered to appear before the court to testify in its presence. The
taking of depositions is very similar to the practice followed in
Wisconsin. They may be taken anywhere in the United States
on oral interrogatories, and before a variety of officers, including
notaries public, and also including commissioners of the court
of claims, who can be appointed at any time and thus furnish
an officer at any place where none exists. The deposition may
also be taken on written interrogatories, in which case the opposing party has the right to file written cross-interrogatories to
accompany the commission, or has the right, by giving fiotice,
to be present when the claimant's written 'interrogatories are
answered and to cross-examine orally. In foreign countries the
depositions are required to be taken upon commission and written
interrogatories. While the rules literally contemplate the prompt
and orderly closing of the taking of evidence first by the claimant
and then by the defendant, in practical operation the court is
extremely liberal in allowing evidence to be taken any time before
the final argument of the case, and indeed afterwards, before its
decision, upon any reasonable showing of necessity or promotion
of justice.
After the evidence is completed it becomes the duty of the
claimant to file wfth the court a request for findings, s6mething
with which Wisconsin lawyers are entirely familiar, stating
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specifically the detail facts which he claims are established by all
the evidence in the 6ase, including that which has been received
from the executive departments; and also the conclusions of law
which he claims *the court should draw from those facts, and
to accompany this with his written or printed brief, embodying
an abstract of -the evidence. This being done, the case is transferred from the mass of thousands of cases upon the general
docket to what is known as the trial calendar; but this does not
greatly help the situation, for the trial calendar contains manyfold
more cases than the court can dispose of in its anhual term, and
cases are customarily not placed upon the day calenda until the
Government has filed its brief and is ready to argue them. Hence
the cust6m is that after being placed upon the trial calendar, and
as soon as possible consistently with the other business of the
bureau, the active preparation of the defense commences. If the
evidence introduced by the claimant seems to call for the taking of
testimony on behalf of the Government, that is done, and when
completed, the attorney in charge files his brief and argument
consisting of his, contentions adverse to those of the claimant and
of a request for modification of the specific findings requested by
the latter. He also requests any findings of other facts which are
deemed established by the evidence and essential to the defense.
When this brief is filed the case usually quite promptly reaches the
day 'calendar for argument, and is either argued -(usually by an
"assistant attorney," of whom there are several to aid the assistant
attorney-general) or is submitted without argument upon the
briefs. The latter being a very common practice, since it accomplishes some acceleration of the case, relieving it from the
necessity of waiting its turn upori the day calendar. The argument is always to the -full bench of five judges, except for casual
absences, and the consideration of the case is by all who listen
to the argument, and generally in my time was a very careful
study of the true merits of the controversy, with an opinion setting
forth the reasons for the decision.
There is no statute with reference to the entry of judgment,
which is- of course a mere money judgment, but the Supreme
Court has by rules prescribed certain formalities with a Yiew
to the make-up of a convenient record for appeals, of which I
shall speak later. Those require, both as to judgments of the
court of claims and of circuit and district courts, that the record
shall contain a finding of the facts in the case established by the
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evidence, in the nature of a sepcial verdict, but not the evidence
establishing them, and a separate statement of the conclusions
of law upon such facts upon which the court founds such judgment or decrees. This practice is entirely familiar to Wisconsin
practitioners, 'and corresponds almost entirely to the finding of
fact required by our statute in cases tried without a jury. I was
much surprised to find, however, that in many jurisdictions
throughout the United States it was novel, and that neither judges
or members of the bar had any clear conception of the meaning of
the word "finding" in such connection. The Court of Claims
makes up its own findings from the requests filed by the respective
parties, or by originating others.
judgment being entered, either party has a right to move for
a new trial and present its motion either by submission on briefs
or by argument; but the right of the respective parties to make
such motion is very different. By sec. io87 the court is
empowered to grant a new trial on the claimant's motion "for any
of the reasons which by the rules of the common law or chancery
in suits between individuals would furnish sufficient ground for
granting new trial." The motion therefore, however, is by rule
required to be made at the term in which the judgment is
rendered, and must specify with minuteness either the error of
facts, the error of law, or the newly discovered evidence which
is claimed to justify it, with various specificatiQns wlhich I shall
not take time to mention now, as any practitioner will need to
refer to the rules therefor. The Government, however, has much
more ample privilege. Sec. io88 of the revised statutes empower
the court to grant to the Government a new trial at any time while
the claim is pending before it, or on appeal from it, or within
two years next after the final disposition of such claim; and
"final disposition" is held to include as well the decision of the
Supreme Court on appeal as the original judgment entered in the
Court of Claims. Not only is the time thus greatly more extended
in behalf of the Government, but the grounds also. The same
section authorizes the court to grant the new trial upon such
evidence, cumulative or otherwise, as shall satisfy the court that
any fraud, wrong or injustice in the premises has been done the
United States; and the decisions have construed fraud, wrong and
injustice so broadly as to be satisfied by any convincive showing
that the judgment ought to have been the other way, unless in
amount. It seems an anomaly to a lawyer familiar with the
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sanctity of final judgments to find that after the Court of Claims
has adjudicated in favor of a claimant and, on appeal, the Supreme
Court of the United States has affirmed and ratified the judgment,
that such judgment may still be assailed on the mere assertion
that it is unjust and, ought not to have been rendered. But one
familiar with the confused methods of doing business in the
departments, the frequent impossibility -of finding in the service
-or elsewhere the men who had actual contact with the transactions
out of which the claims accrued, and the consequent difficulty of
of making the merits appear as against a prima facie showing by
the claimant who may be more or less restrained by his conscience
from making an untrue statement of facts, soon appreciates the
necessity of such a provision as a qualification of the privilege
accorded by the Government to allow a court to decide whether
it ought to pay money or not. The right to this motion is very
freely exercised by the assistant attorney-general in charge 6f
the government defense, and is received with a degree of favor
by the court that marks the judges thereof with a high degree of
broad-mindedness. Neither neglect nor oversight of the assistant
attorney-general's bureau nor of the executive officers or clerks
is any deterrent. Even a new legal argument tending to a change
in the judgment, justifies the motion and has many times induced
the court to grant it. *I myself presented more than one motion
for no reason whatever except that in my opinion the attorney
who tried the case ought to have called the court's attention to
other considerations, either of fact or law, and that for failure
thereof I believed injustice had resulted to the United States.,
Assuming that a judgment has been entered, the claimant then
procures a copy thereof certified by the clerk of court, and
presents the same to the Secretary of the Treasury who, when
Congress is next in session, certifies to it all of such judgments
which the attorney general certified to him are not intended to be
appealed, and, as I have said, they are usually included in the
general appropriation. Judgments which have been appealed to
the Supreme Court and are afterwards affirmed, draw interest
at four per cent from the date of filing the judgment of the Court
of Claims in the treasury department up to and including the
date of the mandate and of affirmance.
To the general practitioner, whose client and witnesses live
in his own vicinity, it often will be more convenient and probably
more expeditious to avail himself of the concurrent jurisdiction
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of the local federal courts, which is conferred by sec. 2 of the
Act of March 3, 1887. Ch. 359, known*as the Tucker Act. That
jurisdiction is entirely concurrent with the Court of Claims over
all claims within the general jurisdiction of the court; to the
extent of $I,OOO in the district court and $ioooo in the circuit
court, except as to claims of government officers for compensation. The rules of law affecting the merits of the claim are of
course the same. The practice, however, is slightly more technical
in analogy to other suits in those courts. By sec. 4 of the Tucker
Act "such procedure shall be in accordance with the rules of the
respective courts"; controlled, however, by the rules of the
Supreme Court requiring the record to contain a finding and not
the evidence. By the Tucker Act right of appeal was granted
from the judgments of district and circuit courts to the same
extent and in the same manner as then existed from the Court
of Claims.
No costs are allowed for or against either party, and there are
no fees of court officers to be paid by either.
Viii
Direct appeals to the Supreme Court are allowed from judgments of the Court of Claims by sec. 707-708 R. S. U. S., which
provide (Sec. 7o7):
"An appeal to the Supreme Court shall be allowed on behalf
of the United States from all judgments of the Court of Claims
adverse to the United States; and on behalf of the plaintiff in
any case where the amount in controversy exceeds $3,ooo, or
where his claim is forfeited to the United States by the judgment
of said court as provided in sec. io89."
(Sec. 708): "All appeals from the Court of Claims shall be
taken within ninety days after the judgment is rendered, and
shall be allowed under such regulations as the Supreme Court
may direct."
Appeals from judgments of the Circuit and District Courts in
the appeals jurisdiction are regulated by the same statutes and
rules, by virtue of sec. 9 of the Tucker Act, which is held to
makes secs. 707 and 7o8 applicable, so that they go direct to the
Supreme Court instead of to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The procedure is, again, very simple. The rules require the
record to consist of the pleadings, the findings and the judgment,
without the evidence, and the review is therefore merely of the
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questions of law, as a general rule. The Supreme Court has,
however, under its power of regulation, the authority to order
up the evidence or any other of the proceedings, and in very rare
instances has exercised this power. La Abra Silver Mining Co.,
175 U. S. 423.
An appeal is accomplished by filing with the clerk an application
for appeal signed by the claimant or his attorney of record, or by
the attorney-general or his proper assistant attorney-generalj and
must be allowed either by the court if in session, or the Chief
Justice if in vacation. The record is made up by the clerk and
transmitted, whereupon the case takes its place on the calendar
of the Supreme Court and proceeds like other causes.

